

Information Bounds and Convergence Rates for Side-Channel Security Evaluators

Loïc Masure **Gaëtan Cassiers** Julien Hendrickx
François-Xavier Standaert



Table of Contents

Leakage certification

State-of-the art

A discussion of eHI

New Metrics

Content


Leakage certification

State-of-the art

A discussion of eHI

New Metrics

Profiled SCA



Information-based Leakage Certification

What is the minimal number of traces N_a^* needed for the best adversary to succeed with proba. $\geq \beta$?

Information-based Leakage Certification

What is the minimal number of traces N_a^* needed for the best adversary to succeed with proba. $\geq \beta$?

MI bound [dCGRP19]:

$$N_a^* \geq \frac{f(\beta)}{\text{MI}(Y; \mathbf{L})}$$

Information-based Leakage Certification

What is the minimal number of traces N_a^* needed for the best adversary to succeed with proba. $\geq \beta$?

MI bound [dCGRP19]:

$$N_a^* \geq \frac{f(\beta)}{\text{MI}(\mathbf{Y}; \mathbf{L})}$$

How can we bound $\text{MI}(\mathbf{Y}; \mathbf{L})$?

Problem parameters

- ▶ Y : target intermediate variable, n -bit (uniform)
- ▶ \mathbf{L} : leakage trace: continuous \mathbb{R}^D or discrete $\{0, 1\}^{\omega D}$ sampling
- ▶ $m(Y | \mathbf{L})$: profiled model, approximates true distribution $p(Y | \mathbf{L})$
- ▶ \mathcal{S}_a : set of attack traces, $N_a = |\mathcal{S}_a|$
- ▶ \mathcal{S}_p : set of profiling traces, $N_p = |\mathcal{S}_p|$

Content

Leakage certification

State-of-the art

A discussion of eHI

New Metrics

MI lower bound

Mutual information formula:

$$\text{MI}(Y; \mathbf{L}) = H(Y) + \mathbb{E}_{y, l} \log_2 (\text{Pr}(Y = y \mid \mathbf{L} = l))$$

MI lower bound

Mutual information formula:

$$\text{MI}(Y; \mathbf{L}) = H(Y) + \mathbb{E}_{y, I} \log_2(\Pr(Y = y \mid \mathbf{L} = I))$$

We can use different models m , m' :

$$\Delta_m^{m'} = H(Y) + \sum_{y, I} m(I, y) \log_2(m'(y \mid I)) \quad \text{MI}(Y; \mathbf{L}) = \Delta_p^p$$

MI lower bound

Mutual information formula:

$$\text{MI}(Y; \mathbf{L}) = H(Y) + \mathbb{E}_{y, I} \log_2 (\text{Pr}(Y = y \mid \mathbf{L} = I))$$

We can use different models m , m' :

$$\Delta_m^{m'} = H(Y) + \sum_{y, I} m(I, y) \log_2 (m'(y \mid I)) \quad \text{MI}(Y; \mathbf{L}) = \Delta_p^p$$

Perceived Information (PI) [RSV+11, BHM+19]:

$$\text{PI}_{m'}(Y; \mathbf{L}) = \Delta_p^{m'}$$

$$\text{PI}_{m'}(Y; \mathbf{L}) \leq \text{MI}(Y; \mathbf{L})$$

MI lower bound

Mutual information formula:

$$\text{MI}(Y; \mathbf{L}) = H(Y) + \mathbb{E}_{y, I} \log_2 (\text{Pr}(Y = y \mid \mathbf{L} = I))$$

We can use different models m , m' :

$$\Delta_m^{m'} = H(Y) + \sum_{y, I} m(I, y) \log_2 (m'(y \mid I)) \quad \text{MI}(Y; \mathbf{L}) = \Delta_p^p$$

Perceived Information (PI) [RSV+11, BHM+19]:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{PI}_{m'}(Y; \mathbf{L}) &= \Delta_p^{m'} & \widehat{\text{PI}}_{m'}(Y; \mathbf{L}) &= \Delta_{\tilde{\epsilon}_{S_V}}^{m'} \\ \text{PI}_{m'}(Y; \mathbf{L}) &\leq \text{MI}(Y; \mathbf{L}) & \mathbb{E} [\widehat{\text{PI}}_{m'}(Y; \mathbf{L})] &\leq \text{MI}(Y; \mathbf{L}) \end{aligned}$$

MI upper bound [BHM+19]

Hypothetical information (HI):

$$\text{HI}_{m'}(Y; L) = \Delta_{m'}^{m'}$$

MI upper bound [BHM+19]

Hypothetical information (HI):

$$\text{HI}_{m'}(Y; \mathbf{L}) = \Delta_{m'}^{m'}$$

Empirical HI:

$$\text{eHI}_{N_p}(Y; \mathbf{L}) = \text{HI}_{\tilde{e}_{S_p}}(Y; \mathbf{L})$$

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\text{eHI}_{N_p}(Y; \mathbf{L}) \right] \geq \text{MI}(Y; \mathbf{L})$$

MI upper bound [BHM+19]

Hypothetical information (HI):

$$\text{HI}_{m'}(Y; \mathbf{L}) = \Delta_{m'}^{m'}$$

Empirical HI:

$$\text{eHI}_{N_p}(Y; \mathbf{L}) = \text{HI}_{\tilde{e}_{S_p}}(Y; \mathbf{L})$$

$$\mathbb{E} [\text{eHI}_{N_p}(Y; \mathbf{L})] \geq \text{MI}(Y; \mathbf{L})$$

How many traces N_p are required to get tight bounds?

Content

Leakage certification

State-of-the art

A discussion of eHI


New Metrics

Profiling Complexity

Trace acquisition campaign: often the critical task (\approx several days)...


Profiling Complexity

Trace acquisition campaign: often the critical task (\approx several days) . . .
 . . . but convergence of eHI is **exponentially slow**.



Profiling Complexity

Trace acquisition campaign: often the critical task (\approx several days) . . .
 . . . but convergence of eHI is **exponentially slow**.



a.k.a. *curse of dimensionality*

Root cause: $\log(\tilde{\epsilon}_{S_p})$

Not an issue for PI.

Non-empirical HI?


Simulation setting:

- ▶ 2-bit masked variable: $\mathbf{L} = \text{HW}(x_0, x_1, y_0, y_1) + N$, $\mathbf{Y} = (x_0 \oplus x_1, y_0 \oplus y_1)$.
- ▶ Gaussian templates

Non-empirical HI?

Simulation setting:

- ▶ 2-bit masked variable: $\mathbf{L} = \text{HW}(x_0, x_1, y_0, y_1) + N$, $\mathbf{Y} = (x_0 \oplus x_1, y_0 \oplus y_1)$.
- ▶ Gaussian templates





SNR = 0.02

PI, HI and MI vs. N_p



Non-empirical HI?

Simulation setting:

- ▶ 2-bit masked variable: $\mathbf{L} = \text{HW}(x_0, x_1, y_0, y_1) + N$, $\mathbf{Y} = (x_0 \oplus x_1, y_0 \oplus y_1)$.
- ▶ Gaussian templates



SNR = 0.02




SNR = 2

PI, HI and MI vs. N_p


Non-empirical HI?

Simulation setting:


- ▶ 2-bit masked variable: $\mathbf{L} = \text{HW}(x_0, x_1, y_0, y_1) + N$, $Y = (x_0 \oplus x_1, y_0 \oplus y_1)$.
- ▶ Gaussian templates



SNR = 0.02



SNR = 2



SNR = 200

PI, HI and MI vs. N_p

Content

Leakage certification

State-of-the art

A discussion of eHI

New Metrics

Towards New Evaluation Metrics

Additional assumptions:

- ▶ Restrict the adversary to a collection \mathcal{H} of models
 - ▶ E.g., Gaussian templates, neural networks. . .
- ▶ The adversary selects the best model from \mathcal{H} .

Towards New Evaluation Metrics

Additional assumptions:

- ▶ Restrict the adversary to a collection \mathcal{H} of models
 - ▶ E.g., Gaussian templates, neural networks...
- ▶ The adversary selects the best model from \mathcal{H} .

New metric: LI

$$\text{LI}_{\mathcal{H}}(Y; \mathbf{L}) = \sup_{m \in \mathcal{H}} \text{PI}_m(Y; \mathbf{L}) \leq \text{MI}(Y; \mathbf{L})$$

Towards New Evaluation Metrics

Additional assumptions:

- ▶ Restrict the adversary to a collection \mathcal{H} of models
 - ▶ E.g., Gaussian templates, neural networks...
- ▶ The adversary selects the best model from \mathcal{H} .

New metric: LI

$$LI_{\mathcal{H}}(Y; \mathbf{L}) = \sup_{m \in \mathcal{H}} PI_m(Y; \mathbf{L}) \leq MI(Y; \mathbf{L})$$

Surrogate to MI: $PI(Y; \mathbf{L}) \leq LI_{\mathcal{H}}(Y; \mathbf{L}) \leq MI(Y; \mathbf{L})$ (still bounds N_a)

What about an upper bound to LI?

Upper Bound to LI

Natural adversarial strategy: maximize $PI_m(Y; \mathbf{L}) = \Delta_p^m$.

Upper Bound to LI

Natural adversarial strategy: maximize $PI_m(Y; \mathbf{L}) = \Delta_p^m$.

Surrogate: maximize $\Delta_{\tilde{e}_{S_p}}^m$.

Upper Bound to LI

Natural adversarial strategy: maximize $PI_m(Y; \mathbf{L}) = \Delta_p^m$.

Surrogate: maximize $\Delta_{\tilde{e}_{S_p}}^m$.

TI-MAXIMIZER

Any \mathcal{H} -adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{H}}$ is a TI-maximizer iff

$$\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{H}}(\tilde{e}_{S_p}) = \operatorname{argmax}_{m \in \mathcal{H}} \Delta_{\tilde{e}_{S_p}}^m .$$

Upper Bound to LI

Natural adversarial strategy: maximize $PI_m(Y; \mathbf{L}) = \Delta_p^m$.

Surrogate: maximize $\Delta_{\tilde{e}_{S_p}}^m$.

TI-MAXIMIZER

Any \mathcal{H} -adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{H}}$ is a TI-maximizer iff

$$\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{H}}(\tilde{e}_{S_p}) = \operatorname{argmax}_{m \in \mathcal{H}} \Delta_{\tilde{e}_{S_p}}^m.$$

Then, we denote


$$TI_{N_p}(Y; \mathbf{L}; \mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{H}}) = \Delta_{\tilde{e}_{S_p}}^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{H}}(\tilde{e}_{S_p})}.$$

TI upper-bounds LI

$$\text{PI}_m(Y; \mathbf{L}) \leq \text{LI}_{\mathcal{H}}(Y; \mathbf{L}) \leq \mathbb{E} \left[\text{TI}_{N_p}(Y; \mathbf{L}; \mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{H}}) \right]$$

TI upper-bounds LI


$$PI_m(Y; \mathbf{L}) \leq LI_{\mathcal{H}}(Y; \mathbf{L}) \leq \mathbb{E} [TI_{N_p}(Y; \mathbf{L}; \mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{H}})]$$



Dotted lines: TI. Solid lines: PI.


Convergence Rate

PI and TI converge to LI at a rate $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(\frac{\text{poly}(\mathcal{H})}{N_p}\right)$.




Convergence Rate

PI and TI converge to LI at a rate $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(\frac{\text{poly}(\mathcal{H})}{N_p}\right)$.




Predict required N_p to reach tightness goal.

Evaluation Outcomes




$\tilde{O}\left(\frac{\text{poly}(\mathcal{H})}{N}\right)$ convergence: no curse of dimensionality.

Evaluation Outcomes




$\tilde{O}\left(\frac{\text{poly}(\mathcal{H})}{N}\right)$ convergence: no curse of dimensionality.

Evaluation Outcomes




$\tilde{O}\left(\frac{\text{poly}(\mathcal{H})}{N}\right)$ convergence: no curse of dimensionality.

Evaluation Outcomes




$\tilde{O}\left(\frac{\text{poly}(\mathcal{H})}{N}\right)$ convergence: no curse of dimensionality.

Evaluation Outcomes




$\tilde{O}\left(\frac{\text{poly}(\mathcal{H})}{N}\right)$ convergence: no curse of dimensionality.

Evaluation Outcomes



$\tilde{O}\left(\frac{\text{poly}(\mathcal{H})}{N}\right)$ convergence: no curse of dimensionality.

Evaluation Outcomes



$\tilde{O}\left(\frac{\text{poly}(\mathcal{H})}{N}\right)$ convergence: no curse of dimensionality.

Conclusion

- ▶ We provide to the Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) evaluator some theoretical insights to assess the *profiling* complexity.
- ▶ Hypothetical Information (HI) can be replaced by a tighter metric: TI
 - ▶ TI converges to LI \rightarrow bounds best *known* attack.
 - ▶ Fast convergence, scalable to highly multivariate leakage.
 - ▶ Loses connection to MI.